We propose a methodology for forecasting the systemic impact of financial institutions in interconnected systems. Utilizing a five-year sample including the 2008/9 financial crisis, we demonstrate how the approach can be used for timely systemic risk monitoring of large European banks and insurance companies. We predict firms' systemic relevance as the marginal impact of individual downside risks on systemic distress. The so-called systemic risk betas account for a company's position within the network of financial interdependencies in addition to its balance sheet characteristics and its exposure towards general market conditions. Relying only on publicly available daily market data, we determine time-varying systemic risk networks, and forecast systemic relevance on a quarterly basis. Our empirical findings reveal time-varying risk channels and firms' specific roles as risk transmitters and/or risk recipients.
Introduction
The breakdown risk for the financial system induced by the distress of an individual firm has long been neglected in financial regulation. Up to the financial crisis 2008-2009, this systemic risk has been exclusively attributed to the idiosyncratic risk of an institution, abstracting from the strong network cross-dependencies in the financial sector causing potential risk spillover effects. In an extensive study for the U.S. financial system, however, Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2012) (HSS) show that it is mainly the interconnectedness within the financial sector that determines the systemic relevance of a particular firm, i.e. its potential to significantly increase the risk of failure of the entire system -denoted as systemic risk. To quantify the systemic impact of an individual company, they propose the so-called realized systemic risk beta, the total effect of a company's time-varying Value at Risk (VaR) on the VaR of the entire system. Thus realized systemic risk betas measure a firm's contribution to systemic risk which then acts as a measure for its systemic relevance. Firms' tail risk is determined from company-specific relevant factors among other companies' tail risks, individual balance sheet characteristics, and financial indicators, where components are selected as being "relevant" via a data-driven statistical regularization technique. The resulting individual-specific models give rise to a financial risk network, capturing exposures of financial firms towards the distress of others. These network risk spill-over channels contain important information for supervision authorities as sources for systemic risk. Their data-driven determination of firms' systemic relevance from publicly available data distinguishes HSS from the number of other recently proposed methods for refined measurement and prediction of systemic risk, see, e.g., Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) , White, Kim, and Manganelli (2010) , Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009) , Brownlees and Engle (2011) , Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) , Giesecke and Kim (2011) , Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2012) , Koopman, Lucas, and Schwaab (2011) , Engle, Jondeau, and Rockinger (2012) , or Schwaab, Koopman, and Lucas (2011) among many others.
Effective supervision requires models which can be used for forecasting and which are reliable even if estimation periods are short. The original HSS framework, however, is not tailored to short-term forecasting of systemic risk and must be adapted for prediction purposes. Firstly, the HSS-systemic risk network is static, i.e., it is estimated once using the entire dataset and then forms the basis for estimation of respective time-varying realized betas. However, empirical evidence suggests that network links might change over time, especially in crisis periods. Secondly, in order to exploit additional variation, quarterly balance sheet characteristics are interpolated by cubic splines over the analyzed time period. Therefore, out-of-sample forecasting is not possible. Thirdly, the penalty parameter required for the model selection step is chosen such that a backtest criterion is optimized. VaR backtests, however, generally rely on counting and analyzing VaR exceedances, which is reasonable when the time series is long. Though for short estimation periods, these tests should be replaced by more adequate quantile versions of F-tests.
In this paper, we extend the HSS framework to allow for flexible systemic risk forecasting. The estimation period is shortened using rolling windows of only one year of data. This excludes influence of back-dated events on current forecasts while still pertaining sufficient prediction accuracy. The models are re-estimated each quarter, resulting in time-varying systemic risk networks. Instead of interpolating, information on firmspecific balance sheets is only updated when it is published at the end of each quarter.
The model selection penalty is chosen such that the in-sample fit in the respective annual observation window is optimal. This is examined via an F-test for quantile regression.
The empirical analysis investigates systemic risk in Europe. The data set covers stock prices and balance sheets of major European banks and insurance companies as well as financial indicators, including country-specific variables, during the period around the 2008/9 financial crisis. We illustrate that our approach could serve as a monitoring tool for supervisors as it captures and effectively predicts systemic relevance over time.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the forecasting methodology. It provides an algorithm for model selection and estimation of firm-specific VaRs and introduces how to estimate and forecast realized systemic risk betas. Section 3 describes the data set. Estimation results, their detailed implications and respective robustness checks are contained in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Forecasting Methodology
We extend the framework of Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2012) (HSS) and the HSS measure for systemic relevance in the presence of network effects, the realized systemic risk beta. Whereas HSS focus on a single static network as a basis for estimating systemic impact of financial institutions, we progress by determining time-varying networks in a forecasting setting. These allow capturing changing risk spillover channels within the system, which are tailored to short-term forecasts from the model.
Time-Varying Networks
In a densely interconnected financial system, the tail risk of an institution i at a time point t is determined not only by its own balance sheet characteristics Z i t 1 and general market conditions M t 1 but also by indications for distress in closely related banks in the system. For each bank in the system, we regard a corresponding return observation as marking a distress event whenever this return is below the empirical 10% quantile. In such cases, these extreme returns might induce cross-effects on the riskiness of other banks in the system. We record these as so-called loss exceedances, i.e., the values of returns in case of an exceedance of the 10% quantile and zeros otherwise. Accordingly, the set of potential risk drivers R for a bank i therefore comprises network impacts N i t from any other bank in the system, where each component of N i t consists of loss exceedances for any bank but firm i in the system. We measure tail risk by the conditional Value at Risk, V aR i , for firm i and by V aR s for the system, respectively. Using a post-LASSO technique as in HSS, the large set of potential risk drivers R t = (Z i t 1 , M t 1 , N i t ) for institution i can be reduced to a group of "relevant" risk drivers R (i) t . Selected tail-risk cross-effects from other banks in the system constitute network links from these banks to institution i. Repeating the analysis for all banks i in the system, relevant risk channels can be depicted and summarized in a respective network graph. The recent financial crisis, however, has shown that such network interconnections may change over time as the relevance of certain institutions for the risk of others might vary substantially. Thus adequate short-run predictions of systemic importance should mainly be based on current dependence structures. We address this issue by a time-dependent selection of relevant risk drivers R (i,t) t according to the algorithm described below. Driven by the quarterly publication frequency of companies' balance sheet information we re-evaluate the relevance of all potential risk drivers for each institution in the system at the beginning of each quarter based on data from the respective previous 12 months and incorporate the latest balance sheet news. We therefore obtain quarterly time-varying tail risk networks which reflect the most current information of risk channels within the financial system. They are tailored for short-term quarterly predictions of the systemic riskiness of firms in the system.
With the relevant risk drivers R (i,t) for firm i and time t in a specific quarter, individual tail risk can be determined from observations up to one year before t as
where coefficients b ⇠ are obtained in the post-LASSO step from quantile regression of X i on (1, R (i,t) ) as part of the procedure described below.
Selecting relevant risk drivers and determining their effects in firms' tail risk
We adapt the data-driven procedure of HSS to account for time-variation in tail risk networks and marginal systemic risk contributions. The automatic selection procedure is based on a sequential F-test in contrast to the backtest criterion in HSS. Determination of relevant risk drivers R (i,t 0 ) at the beginning of a quarter t 0 uses information of observations within the previous year. Hence it is based on approximately ⌧ = 250 observations R t 0 ⌧ , . . . , R t 0 , where R t is a K-vector of centered observations of the potential regressors. We fix a ⌫-equidistant grid c = {c 1 > . . . > c l = c 1 ⌫(l 1) > c L = 0} for values of a constant c, where c 1 is chosen such that the corresponding penalty parameter is sufficiently large for selecting not more than one regressor into the model. For our purposes, we set c 1 = 30 and ⌫ = 1.
Step 1: For each c 2 c , determine the penalty parameter i t 0 (c) from the data in the following two sub-steps as in Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011) :
Step a) Take ⌧ + 1 iid draws from U [0, 1] independent of R t 0 ⌧ , . . . , R t 0 denoted as U 0 , . . . , U ⌧ . Conditional on observations of R, calculate
Step b) Repeat step a) B=500 times generating the empirical distribution of ⇤ i t 0 conditional on R through ⇤ i t 0 1 , . . . , ⇤ i t 0 B . For a confidence level ↵ = 0.1 in the selection, set
Step 2: Run separate l 1 -penalized quantile regressions for i t 0 (c 1 ) and i t 0 (c 2 ) from step 1 and obtain
with the set of potentially relevant regressors R t 0 t = (R t 0 t,k ) K k=1 , componentwise variationˆ 2 k = 1 ⌧ +1 P ⌧ t=0 (R t 0 t,k ) 2 and loss function ⇢ q (u) = u(q I(u < 0)), where the indicator I(·) is 1 for u < 0 and zero otherwise.
Step 3: Drop all components in R with absolute marginal effects | e ⇠ i t 0 (c)| below a threshold ⌧ = 0.0001 keeping only the K it 0 (c) remaining relevant regressors R (i,t 0 ) (c) for c 2 {c 1 , c 2 }. As c 1 > c 2 , the sets of selected relevant regressors are nested
Step 2 with i (c 2 ) and i (c 3 ) from Step 1. Otherwise re-estimate (2) without penalty term for the larger model c 2 only with the respective selected relevant uncentered regressors R (i,t 0 ) (c 2 ) and an intercept. This regression yields the post-LASSO estimates c ⇠ it 0 q (c 2 ). Apply an F-test for joint significance of regressors R (i,t 0 ) (c 2 \c 1 ). If they are significant, restart Step 2 with i (c 2 ) and i (c 3 ) from Step 1b. Continue until additional regressors R (i,t 0 ) (c l+1 \c l ) from penalty c l to c l+1 are no longer found to be significant. Then the final model is obtained from c l yielding the set of relevant regressors R (i,t 0 ) (c l ) with corresponding post-LASSO estimates c ⇠ it 0 q (c l ) for the coefficients.
Note that we aim at keeping the model parsimonious. Therefore we set the significance level underlying the F-test in Step 3 to 5%. This corresponds to the minimum feasible level still guaranteeing stability of the procedure given the available sample size and the substantial correlation structure of regressors in the LASSO selection step. We found that imposing higher accuracy of lower F-test levels, tends to induce robustness problems such as non-nested models in the sequential upward procedure. In contrast, higher significance levels generally result in larger systemic risk networks corresponding to a wider view of potential "relevance".
Forecasting Systemic Impact
In an interconnected financial system, we measure the systemic risk impact of a specific bank i as the total realized effect of its riskiness on distress of the entire financial system given network and market externalities. 1 This can be empirically determined via
where [ V aR ( i) comprises tail risks of all other banks in the system selected as relevant risk drivers for bank i in the corresponding network topology. The marginal effect s|i,t of the risk of company i might vary linearly over time in selected firm-specific balance sheet characteristics Z i⇤ t 1 . Coefficients in (3) can be obtained via standard quantile regression analogously to (2) without penalty term. Corresponding to the one-year estimation window for the time-varying network, we also determine parameters in (3) at the beginning of each quarter, based on observations dating back no longer than one year. The systemic relevance of a company can then be predicted from the beginning of a quarter t 0 to the next quarter t 0 +⌧ as realized beta
where t denotes information up to time t. Within a quarter, predictions are updated by
Data
Our sample of financial firms comprises 20 European banks and insurance companies. A list can be found in As proxies for the market's expectations on economic growth and to capture countryspecific effects on individual VaRs, we include several ten year government bond yields (Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, United States, and Greece) as well as yield spreads (ten years minus three months yields) of German and U.S. government bonds. Finally, accounting for the global interconnectedness of financial markets, we include returns on financial sector indices, FTSE Financials Japan, Asia, and US.
When estimating systemic risk betas in the second stage, a subset of the above macro financial indicators is required as control variables. Here, we take the changes in the EuroStoxx 600 index, VStoxx, Euribor, iTraXX, the three FTSE Financial indices, the real estate index, and the spread between Eurepo and the Bubill rate.
Results

Time-varying tail risk networks
Having identified the tail risk drivers for each firm allows constructing a tail risk network.
Following HSS, we take all firms as nodes in a network and identify a network link from firm i to firm j whenever the loss exceedance of i is selected as a tail risk driver for j. With our analysis we can statistically determine "relevant" (directed) risk connections in the financial network. Identifying the underlying economic causes for a link between two companies, however, is more difficult given the available data. Nevertheless, the in- Despite their perceived quite different situation (see Table 1 ), the network analysis, however, reveals that both banks have been deeply connected. Being bi-directional before the crisis, the links became particularly pronounced and rather one-directional during the Although all of these institutions operate on a global level, we still observe a substantial extent of persistent country-specific risk channels. These effects reflect a strong interconnectedness and consequently inherent instability of national banking systems. These within-country dependencies are complemented by cross-country linkages and industry-specific channels. Examples for the latter are tail risk connections prevailing within the insurance sector including Allianz, AXA, Aviva, Münchener Rück and Aegon. Their interconnectedness even increased during the financial crisis which is likely to be caused by exposure to the same classes of toxic assets.
Our approach, however, also captures interesting time variations in tail risk channels.
In Analyzing the pure number of outgoing tail risk connections (illustrated by the size of nodes in the network graphs), we identify Barclays, Santander, AXA, BNP Paribas, ING, Société Générale and Crédit Agricole as deeply connected companies. Actually, the latter four were companies which have been bailed out by their governments and got partly nationalized. Our analysis indicates that these governmental capital injections were indeed justifiable as these companies have been (and still are) in the core of the network and therefore serve as distributors and multipliers of systemic risk. According to the identified network connections, failure of one of these institutions would substantially threaten the stability of the financial system.
Systemic risk rankings
After having determined individual companies' VaRs, realized systemic risk betas can be estimated and forecasts for each quarter can be computed according to equation 4. It should be noted, that often differences in beta estimates between direct neighboring firms in the obtained rankings are small and thus not statistically significant. Hence orderings in Table 4 should rather be seen as an indication for a company's relative systemic importance characterizing groups of similar relative systemic impact. We therefore suggest a "traffic light system" of high, medium and low ranked systemically risky banks as reported in These effects are supported by the pointwise, ungrouped results in Table 4 revealing strong variations of the relative systemic riskiness during the crisis. This is obviously induced by a severe instability of the financial system during this period and is also confirmed by the high variability of network connections as discussed above. Conversely, a higher stability of systemic risk patterns over time is observed in the periods before and after the financial crisis (i.e., 2007 and 2010). Note that the high variation of pointwise predicted systemic risk betas is neither an artefact of the LASSO-procedure for network selection nor an indication of problems in selecting the penalization constant in practice.
Plots of estimated individual VaRs rather reveal a major part of the volatile behavior stemming from the hard thresholding with which other companies' loss exceedances are measured and thus appear and disappear as potential candidates for network links over time.
We leave it for future work to determine appropriate smoothed versions of exceedances.
In our study we remain conservative towards the type II error in detecting network links and keep the extreme cut-off behavior where firms can only be risk drivers if in distress and not on the way towards potential distress. Our recommended classification of firms for supervisors in this setting is thus broad and groupwise as shown in Table 3 . .
b
⌧ is known to be more robust towards deviations from normality than the Pearson correlation coefficient (see, e.g., Dehling, Vogel, Wendler, and Wied (2012) , and aims directly at comparing the ordering of variables.
To distinguish between a pre-crisis and (post) crisis period, we compute Kendall's ⌧ for pooled data from 2006 to the end of 2007 (8 quarters) as well as for the subsequent period including the crisis and its aftermath (12 quarters). Table 5 reports the estimated rank correlations together with the outcomes of one-sided significance tests, with the null hypothesis H 0 : ⌧  0. Based on the pre-crisis period, we find that correlations of 0,11 between systemic risk betas and leverage as well as maturity mismatch are significant at a 5% level, whereas the correlation with size is smaller and only significant at 10%.
These results indicate that even in non-crisis periods mainly network effects do drive predictions of systemic relevance in realized systemic risk betas rather than idiosyncratic characteristics. Within the firm specific effects, we also find that size is not the dominating factor which is in contrast to the well-known "to big to fail" statement. Important idiosyncratic risk drivers are rather leverage and funding risk, approximated by maturity mismatch. During the (post) crisis period, estimated correlations become insignificant and are virtually zero. This shows that from 2008 onwards, the influence of observable firm characteristics even decreases further and network connections are the pre-dominant drivers for short-term predictions of firm's systemic riskiness. This also corresponds to a sharp increase of realized systemic risk beta forecasts as shown in Figure 5 .
Out-of-sample validation of forecasts
A direct evaluation of realized systemic risk beta forecasts is not possible, since they cannot be observed even ex post. As systemic risk betas measure the effect of firms' tail risk on the tail risk of the system, an observable proxy benchmark is the tail correlation between the system return and each individual company's return. Accordingly, for a first rough forecast validation setting, we compute quarterly tail correlations based on 10% quantiles balancing the need of a sufficient number of observations on the one hand and the need to capture tail risk. In particular, we estimate the correlations for each quarter k as⇢ s,i
for from observations X s t , X i t with t = t 0,k + 1, ..., t 0,k +⌧ k for each end-of-quarter time point t 0,k , where⌧ k denotes the length of the next quarter, using the Pearson correlation coefficient, see e.g. Ang and Chen (2002) .
As a naive benchmark for assessing a firms' marginal relevance in the financial system, we compute a simple financial system CAPM-type beta defined as the slope coefficient in time series regressions of individual returns on the system return. We take this simplistic competitor as a lower bound benchmark, which is much easier to obtain than our realized systemic risk beta but is obviously "naive" as it does not account for tail dependencies but just mean dependencies and reverts the causality between system returns and individual returns. To evaluate the two different forecasts, we compute the R 2 in separate forecast
where k is the quarter index and b i 2 n e s|i t 0 +⌧ |t 0 , CAP M,i t 0 +⌧ |t 0 o . The higher the respective R 2 , the more variation in future tail correlation is explained by the respective systemic risk forecast. Boxplots of all R 2 s for the different companies are shown in Figure 6 . It turns out that the realized systemic risk beta clearly outperforms the "financial system beta" in forecasting future tail dependence between the system and individual banks and insurance companies.
In a second forecast evaluation scenario, we study the ability of the two measures to explain variations in returns in periods of extreme (negative) realizations denoted as the 10% worst outcomes of equity returns for each firm. Accordingly, we take the average 10% loss exceedancesĒx i of all firms in the quarter k following the estimation period, and run cross-sectional regressions thereof on the respective realizations of the two competing betas,Ē
with b i k defined as above. Such a regression has some analogy to a typical second pass CAPM regression linking cross-sectional variations in excess returns to the cross-sectional variation in market betas. Although the systemic risk beta is not tailored to such a setting, our findings in Figure 7 show that on average it provides a better prediction of extreme market valuations than a the simple financial system CAPM-type beta.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a framework for forecasting financial institutions' marginal contribution to systemic risk based on their interconnectedness in terms of extreme downside risks. There are four major challenges in this context: Firms' (conditional) tail risks are unobserved and must be estimated from data. Determining such individual risk levels appropriately results in high-dimensional models due to the large number of potential network connections. These network dependencies, however, vary substantially over time in the considered hard-thresholding case for cross-effects. Therefore forecasting stability and responsiveness require careful balancing and yield a traffic light system for systemic risk forecasts. To tackle these issues, we adapt the two-stage quantile regression approach by Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2012) Table 2 : List of included financial institutions. As most of them provide a broad range of services, we differentiate between banks and insurance companies, according to their main field of business activities. Furthermore, we state the country their headquarters are located in. 
